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I.

Introduction

New Jersey’s 127 miles of coastline1 play a vital role in the state’s economy and its
residents’ way of life. While coastal communities have a long history of storms and flooding,
sea level rise and changes in hurricane activity create new risks. This vulnerability demands
climate change adaptation policies. Notwithstanding the importance of New Jersey’s coastline
and its vulnerability, the state is legally ill-equipped to handle the threats of global warming. 2
According to New Jersey’s Department of Environmental Protection (NJDEP), much of
the state’s densely populated coastal areas are vulnerable to the effects of climate change,
including flooding, increasingly frequent storms, erosion, and sea level rise. 3 In New Jersey,
62,209 homes are at risk of chronic flooding by 2045. 4 These homes are worth more than $26

* J.D. Candidate, 2022, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., summa cum laude, 2019, Loyola University of
Maryland. I would like to express my gratitude to my faculty advisor, Angela C. Carmella, for her guidance and
support in the writing of this Comment.
1 NORBERT P. PSUTY & DOUGLAS D. OFIARA, C OASTAL H AZARD M ANAGEMENT: LESSONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
FROM NEW JERSEY 9–10 (Rutgers Univ. Press eds., 2002).
2 This Comment uses the terms “global warming” and “climate change” interchangeably.
3 New Jersey’s Coastal Community Vulnerability Assessment and Mapping Protocol , NJDEP OFF. OF C OASTAL
M GMT. ii (Dec. 2011) [hereinafter NJDEP Assessment and Protocol], https://www.nj.gov/dep/cmp/docs/ccvampfinal.pdf.
4 Tom Davis, Here’s How Many NJ Towns, Homes Are at Risk of Chronic Flooding , PATCH (June 25, 2018),
https://patch.com/new-jersey/pointpleasant/here-s-how-many-nj-towns-homes-are-risk-chronic-flooding.
2

billion, house approximately 79,000 people, and contribute nearly $390 million to local property
tax bases.5 Despite these hazards, new construction and reconstruction continue in the state’s
239 coastal towns, and municipalities have yet to respond to these realities.6 Shoreline
developments throughout New Jersey have “frequently occurred without adequate regard for
coastal hazards.”7 A study by Climate Central, a Princeton-based research group, and Zillow, the
national real estate firm, “estimated that 3,087 homes [were] built [in New Jersey] between 2009
and 2017—together worth more than $3 billion” in areas that are expected to flood once a year
by 2050.8
In protecting our coastlines, the government must balance private property rights against
the threats of climate change. Adaptation strategies, such as dune replenishment, have become
common methods of coastline protection, but they come at an expense to the public.9 In most
cases, coastal projects require the government to exercise its eminent domain power to obtain
possession of strips of private property on coastal lots.10 New Jersey, despite the importance of
its coast, does not have statutory or judicial policies to address legal issues when private property

5

Id.
Sustainable & Resilient Coastal Communities: A Comprehensive Coastal Hazard Mitigation Strategy Final
Report, NEW JERSEY FUTURE 1 (Sept. 2017), https://www.njfuture.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/New-JerseyFuture-Resilient-Coastal-Communities-Project-Report-2017.pdf.
7 Susanne C. Moser et al., Coastal Zone Development and Ecosystems, in Climate Change Impacts in the United
States: The Third National Climate Assessment, 579 U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM ED. 589 (May
2014).
8 Jon Hurdle, Estimate Revised Up of New Shore Homes Imperiled by Sea -level Rise, Storm Surge, NJ SPOTLIGHT
NEWS (Aug. 14, 2019), https://www.njspotlight.com/2019/08/19 -08-13-estimate-rises-of-new-shore-homesimperiled-by-sea-level-rise-and-storm-surge/.
9 See T.J. Campbell & L. Benedet, Beach Nourishment Magnitudes and Trends in the U.S., SI 39 J. OF C OASTAL
RESEARCH 57, 63 (2006), available http://www.cerf-jcr.org/images/stories/09_tom.pdf; James G. Titus, Rising Seas,
Coastal Erosion, and the Takings Clause: How to Save Wetlands and Beaches Without Hurting Property Owners ,
57 M D. L. REV. 1279, 1308 (1998).
10 See, e.g., Property Owners Throw Cold Water on N.J. Shore Protective Dunes Plan, W. VA. PUB. B ROADCASTING
(May 26, 2015, 3:47 PM), http://wvpublic.org/post/property -owners-throw-cold-water-nj-shore-protective-dunesplan.
6
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rights and the threats of global warming are in balance. The state is legally unprepared for
handling the threat of climate change.
This Comment evaluates the effectiveness and feasibility of climate change adaptation
measures and argues that New Jersey, at the state and local level, must adopt holistic, data-driven
solutions to adapt to this new reality, protect properties from flooding and storm surges, and
preserve our coastal environment. A comprehensive regulatory scheme aimed at mitigating the
effects of global warming would recognize that development in areas vulnerable to repeated
flooding is a nuisance that the government should regulate to minimize and phase out. This
Comment calls on New Jersey State courts to take an expansive approach to public nuisance
doctrine under regulatory takings jurisprudence. By recognizing that climate-driven regulations,
as a form of nuisance prevention, are immune from takings claims, courts can facilitate
environmental protection measures. This Comment argues that regulation for the purposes of
environmental protection is a public purpose. If an area is vulnerable to the effects of climate
change, then it is per se a nuisance to continue using that land. Courts should broadly construe
nuisance doctrine to serve as a preclusive defense to landowners’ regulatory takings claims.
Part II will explore the harms of climate change and its impact on New Jersey’s coastline.
It will provide data on rising sea levels, tidal flooding, the frequency and extent of storm surges,
and erosion and the economic impacts of these phenomena. In Part III, this Comment will
introduce state and local governments’ land use regulation through the zoning power and takings
power.
In Part IV, this Comment will critique New Jersey’s response to climate change and the
various existing strategies. This section will also discuss the limitations of the use of eminent
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domain and zoning powers. Part V will advocate for an expansion of the nuisance doctrine to
prevent the development of vulnerable coastal communities.
Finally, in Part VI, this Comment will make a proposal for how New Jersey can mitigate
the effects of climate change on coastal communities through land use regulations. It will outline
policy and statutory recommendations that should be incorporated into coastal communities’
planning ordinances. The law would overtly recognize nuisance prevention as a legitimate land
use control.
II.
A.

Climate Change and its Effects on New Jersey Coastline

Assessing the Harms of Climate Change
Global climate change is a change to “the average weather conditions over an extended

period of time.”11 In the last fifty years, human activity has altered the environment on an
unprecedented scale through greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. 12 GHGs, such as carbon dioxide,
in the atmosphere retain heat from sunlight, causing Earth to warm. 13 As Earth warms,
previously frozen regions melt, causing rising sea levels—a significant threat because
approximately forty percent of the world’s population lives in coastal areas. 14
A 2019 Rutgers University and Department of Environmental Protection report predicted
that, by 2070, sea levels will rise nearly four feet in New Jersey, a projection that is two-times
the global average.15 Using information from the report, a map “shows that nearly all of the

11

Joseph F.C. DiMento & Pamela Doughman, Introduction: Making Climate Change Understandable, in CLIMATE
CHANGE: WHAT I T M EANS FOR US, OUR CHILDREN, AND OUR GRANDCHILDREN, 1 (MIT Press 2014).
12 See Causes of Climate Change, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/science/causes.html (last visited Jan. 5,
2021) (finding that since the industrial era, humans have notably increased the amount of greenhouse gases emitted
into the atmosphere); see generally, Overview of Greenhouse Gases, EPA,
http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/ghgemissions/gases.html (last visited Jan. 5, 2021)
13 See Causes of Climate Change, supra note 12; see generally, Overview of Greenhouse Gases, supra note 12.
14 Economics and Demographics, NOAA OFFICE FOR C OASTAL M GMT . (2020), https://coast.noaa.gov/states/fastfacts/economics-and-demographics.html.
15 NJDEP Assessment and Protocol, supra note 3, at 5.
5

Jersey Shore south of Point Pleasant Beach, as well as areas of Essex, Hudson, Passaic, Union,
Cumberland and Salem counties, could be under water by 2070.” 16 From 1911 to 2019, the sea
level rose 1.5 feet along the New Jersey coast, compared to a 0.6 feet total change in the global
mean sea level.17 Future projections of sea level rise indicate that New Jersey’s coastal areas are
likely to experience sea level rise of 0.5 to 1.1 feet between the years 2000 and 2030, and 0.9 to
2.1 feet between 2000 and 2050.18
New Jersey residents have also experienced more high-tide floods, or “sunny-day
flooding,” in the absence of an associated storm.19 The frequency of high tides exceeding the
current high-tide flood threshold will continue to increase with sea level rise.20 The average of
high-tide floods in the 1950s was less than one per year.21 Between 2007 and 2016, Atlantic
City averaged eight high-tide floods per year.22 Based on the projected range of sea level rise,
Atlantic City will experience 17 to 75 days of expected high-tide flooding in 2030, and 45 to 255
days in 2050.23
A 2019 report by the Rhodium Group concluded that tidal flooding has more than
doubled.24 Since 1980, sea level has risen nearly six inches, and the number of homes at risk of
sunny-day flooding has increased 110%.25 This affects approximately 23,000 homes and

16

Davis, supra note 4.
New Jersey’s Rising Seas and Changing Coastal Storms: A Summary of th e 2019 Science and Technical Advisory
Panel, RUTGERS (Nov. 2019) [hereinafter Rutgers Panel Summary],
https://climatechange.rutgers.edu/images/STAP_SUMMARY_FINAL_FINAL_11 -25-19.pdf.
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 Rutgers Panel Summary, supra note 17.
24 Hannah Hess et al., New Jersey’s Rising Coastal Risk, R HODIUM GROUP (Oct. 29, 2019),
https://rhg.com/research/new-jersey-flooding-hurricanes-costs-climatechange/.
25 Id.
17
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commercial buildings worth a total of $13 billion.26 According to the study, the counties most at
risk from flooding are Ocean, Cape May, Atlantic, and Monmouth.27
Coastal storms, such as tropical storms, hurricanes, and nor’easters, produce storm
surges, the impact of which is heightened by tides and winds.28 Storm surge flooding can wash
over barrier islands and create new inlets, thereby endangering protected wetlands.29 Studies
have also shown that the frequency and extent of storm surges have increased since the 1980s;
therefore, more of today’s buildings are now at risk of flooding once during a 30-year
mortgage.30 Another threat is coastal erosion—one of the most common and persistent
hazards.31 Wind, currents, and waves are the main contributors to erosion and are exacerbated
by storms.32
The scientific community is in agreement about the effects of global warming. 33 This
Comment does not attempt to investigate the existing data and merely seeks to use this consensus
as an aid in developing mitigation strategies.

B.

The Economic Impact of Climate Change
Rising sea levels, storm surges, and erosion not only have ecological impacts, but also

threaten the highly developed Jersey Shore. 34 Coastal flooding endangers private property, roads
and bridges, storm-water infrastructure, utilities, and businesses. 35 The Rhodium Group’s 2019

26

Id.
Id.
28 NJDEP Assessment and Protocol, supra note 3, at 4.
29 Id.
30 Hess et al., supra note 24.
31 NJDEP Assessment and Protocol, supra note 3, at 4.
32 Id.
33 See Consensus: 97% of Climate Scientists Agree, NASA, http://climate.nasa.gov/scientific-consensus/ (last visited
November 1, 2020).
34 See Laura Mansnerus, New Jersey is Running Out of Open Land it can Build On, N.Y. TIMES (May 24, 2003),
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/05/24/nyregion/new-jersey-is-running-out-of-open-land-it-can-build-on.html.
35 NJDEP Assessment and Protocol, supra note 3, at 4.
27
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report focused on the economics of coastal risk from climate change.36 The report estimated
that, since the 1980s, between 62,000 and 86,000 more homes and commercial properties, worth
a combined value of more than $60 billion, are now in areas with a 1-in-30 chance of hurricane
flooding.37 New Jersey coastline’s exposure is projected to grow. 38 Based on sea level rise
projections, an additional 73,000 to 113,000 buildings worth a combined $60 billion to $96
billion will likely be in the 1-in-30-year floodplain by 2050.39
The effects of rising temperatures and sea levels are already having a significant impact
on property values.40 Research by First Street Foundation suggests that tidal flooding caused by
rising sea levels has reduced home values in New Jersey by $4.5 billion.41 Tropical storm
Sandy, which made landfall in 2012, alone cost New Jersey $29.4 billion.42
These projections of climate change and its effects serve as important baselines for
developing policy directions, including changes to land use regulation, that New Jersey must
adopt to address these challenges. Some see environmental regulation of private property as
antithetical to economic growth.43 However, as is evident from the massive costs of Hurricane
Sandy,44 “annual flooding will stifle growth more than any regulation.”45

36

Hess et al., supra note 24.
Id.
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 Tom Johnson, What’s Ahead for NJ — More Tidal Flooding, More Battering from Hurricanes? , NJ SPOTLIGHT
NEWS (Oct. 29, 2019), https://www.njspotlight.com/2019/10/whats-ahead-for-nj-more-tidal-flooding-morebattering-from-hurricanes/.
41 Id.
42 Chris Francescani, Chris Christie: Hurricane Sandy New Jersey Damage Will Cost At Least $ 29.4 Billion ,
H UFFINGTON POST (Nov. 23, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/11/23/chris-christie-hurricanesandynewjersey_n_2179909.html.
43 Naomi Klein, Capitalism vs. the Climate, THE NATION (Nov. 9, 2011),
https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/capitalism -vs-climate/.
44 Francescani, supra note 42.
45 Matthew Knoblauch, Land and Water Use in the United States: You Probably Shouldn’t Build There , 16
SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL’Y 4, 13 (2015).
37
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III.

New Jersey’s Land Use Regulation Options for Tackling Flooding

New Jersey has several options, albeit inadequate, to tackle the threat of climate change.
The Government may exercise its power of eminent domain to condemn entire properties or
obtain easements over properties for purposes such as dune replenishment. Localities may also
use their zoning powers to regulate land use and development in coastal areas prone to flooding.
Exercise of the takings and zoning powers, however, may lead to litigation if the government
does not provide just compensation or the regulation’s economic deprivation is so extreme that it
has the effect of a taking.
Parts A and B provide a primer on land use regulation, including state and local actors’
power to enact zoning ordinances for the public welfare and use eminent domain. Part C focuses
on the claims private property owners may have against the government for taking such
measures.

A.

A Primer on Zoning
The Tenth Amendment of the United States Constitution explicitly reserves those powers

not so delegated for the States.46 This reservation of powers enables states to regulate land use.
As industrialization and urbanization sent people from rural to urban and suburban areas in the
early 1900s, some centralized control over land use patterns became necessary.47 Local
governments were best equipped to deal with these local changes. 48 By the late 1920s, to

U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to
the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people.”).
47 See JOHN R. NOLON ET AL ., LAND USE AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT LAW: C ASES AND M ATERIALS 35 (9th
ed. 2017) (“Increased congestion in streets, deplorable housing conditions, new high rise buildings . . . and changing
land use patterns raised numerous conflicts among private land owners.”).
48 See id. at 2–4 (“Local governments were regarded . . . as creatures of the state, authorized by state law to exercise
a wide variety of powers affecting the health, safety, and welfare of their citizens . . . . It is within [the] context of
state reserved authority, that cities, through state constitutional and statutory delega tions, regulate land use today.”).
46
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promote the adoption of zoning ordinances by municipalities, the United States Department of
Commerce created two standard enabling acts as guides for states to adopt when promulgating
their own legislation.49 The Standard Zoning Enabling Act, published in its final version in
1926, encouraged states to empower local governments to regulate zoning, including the power
to regulate the height, size, use, and location of buildings, the size of lots, and population
density.50 In 1928, the Standard City Planning Enabling Act encouraged municipalities to
develop comprehensive plans for “harmonious development” in order to “best promote health,
safety, morals, order, convenience, prosperity, and general welfare . . . .”51
These standard acts were published shortly after the landmark case Village of Euclid v.
Ambler Realty, which held that zoning was a valid exercise of the states’ police powers. 52 The
Village of Euclid adopted a comprehensive zoning ordinance that regulated and restricted “the
location of industries, apartment houses, two-family houses, single family houses, etc., the lot
area to be built upon, the size and height of buildings, etc.” 53 Ambler Realty Company owned a
tract of land in the village and argued that the ordinance operated “to reduce the value of [its]
lands and destroy their marketability for industrial, commercial[,] and residential uses” and
constituted “a present invasion into [its] property rights” and a violation of due process.54

49

Standard State Zoning Enabling Act and Standard City Planning Enabling Act , American Planning Association
(2021), https://www.planning.org/growingsmart/enablingacts/.
50 U.S. Dep’t of Commerce A Standard State Zoning Enabling Act § 1 (1926), https://planning-org-uploadedmedia.s3.amazonaws.com/legacy_resources/growingsmart/pdf/SZEnablingAct1926.pdf (“For the purpose of
promoting health, safety, morals, or the general welfare of the community, the legislative body of cities an d
incorporated villages is hereby empowered to regulate and restrict the height, number of stories, and size of
buildings and other structures, the percentage of lot that may be occupied, the size of yards, courts, and other open
spaces, the density of population, and the location and use of buildings, structures, and land for trade, industry,
residence, or other purposes.”).
51 U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, City Planning Enabling Act § 7 (1928), https://planning-org-uploadedmedia.s3.amazonaws.com/legacy_resources/growingsmart/pdf/CPEnabling%20Act1928.pdf.
52 272 U.S. 365, 397 (1926).
53 Id. at 380.
54 Id. at 386.
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The Court upheld the ordinance as “a valid exercise of authority,”55 but cautioned that
the zoning power is not without limit:
The ordinance now under review, and all similar laws and regulations, must find
their justification in some aspect of the police power, asserted for the public
welfare. The line which in this field separates the legitimate from the illegitimate
assumption of power is not capable of precise delimitation.56
New Jersey has several coastal zoning statutes. The Municipal Land Use Law (MLUL)
of 1976 is New Jersey’s enabling legislation for municipal land use and development planning
and zoning.57 The state legislature also passed the Coastal Area Facility Review Act (CAFRA)
in 1973 “to protect the unique and fragile coastal zones of the State.” 58 This Act calls upon the
state to assist “in the assessment of impacts, stemming from the future location and kinds of
developments within the coastal area, on the delicately balanced environment of that area” so as
to avoid “continuing and ever-accelerating serious adverse economic, social and aesthetic
effects.”59 CAFRA requires that all coastal areas be dedicated to uses “which promote the public
health, safety and welfare, protect public and private property, and are reasonably consistent and
compatible with the natural laws governing the physical, chemical and biological environment of
the coastal area.”60 CAFRA was significantly expanded in 1993, and the threshold for issuance
of permits by the DEP was heightened to provide greater protection to sensitive coastal areas. 61
At this time, however, the legislature also repealed a prior version of the CAFRA statute that
directed the DEP to compose a long-term environmental management strategy for coastal
areas.62 Today, the Coastal Zone Management Rules promulgated by NJDEP establishes the
55

Id. at 397.
Id. at 387.
57 Municipal Land Use Law, N.J. STAT . ANN. §§ 40:55D-25–52:27D-310 (West 2017).
58 In re Egg Harbor Assocs. (Bayshore Centre), 464 A.2d 1115 (1983).
59 Coastal Area Review Act, N.J. STAT . ANN. § 13:19-2 (West 2016),
https://www.nj.gov/dep/landuse/download/13_19.pdf.
60 Id.
61 Committee Statement, N.J. STAT . ANN. 13:19-2 (West Supp. 2002).
62 N.J. STAT . ANN. § 13:19-16, repealed by L. 1993, c. 190, § 2 (effective July 19, 1994).
56
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rules regarding the development of coastal resources and requires a coastal permit for waterfront
development.63
With respect to post-storm beach restoration, the NJDEP has enacted regulations
applicable “to all beaches which are impacted by coastal storms with a recurrence interval equal
to or exceeding a five-year storm event.”64 These after-the-fact responses to storms, however,
are inadequate to fight the full scope of the impending threat of climate change.
Environmental protection interests are often incompatible “with traditional landowner
beliefs in the freedom to use legally owned land as they wish.” 65 Despite the widespread
acceptance of zoning and planning in the post-Euclid century, there remains a tension between
governmental regulation and private ownership of land. This tension will escalate as the
government increasingly regulates land use to mitigate the effect of climate change. Further,
states, in exercising their zoning power, also risk running afoul of the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment, addressed below.66
A unique problem—problem of the nonconforming use—occurs when ownership and use
of a property predate a zoning ordinance prohibiting such use. 67 In the interest of eliminating
inconsistent uses and achieving uniformity within a zoning area, the state may impose
restrictions on nonconforming landowners by limiting expansion or reconstruction of the
property.68 In New Jersey, though, nonconforming use statute provides that
“[a]ny nonconforming use or structure existing at the time of the passage of an ordinance may be

63

N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 7:7-1.1; 7:7-2.1–2.5 (2021).
N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 7:7-10.3 (2021).
65 Jonathan E. Cohen, A Constitutional Safety Valve: The Variance in Zoning and Land -Use Based Environmental
Controls, 22 B.C. ENV’T. AFF. L. REV. 307, 329 (1995).
66 See Section III.D.
67 John R. Nolon, Well Grounded: Using Local Land Use Authority to Achieve Smart Growth, Environmental Law
Institute, 447, 452 (2001).
68 NOLON ET AL ., LAND USE AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT LAW: C ASES AND M ATERIALS, 35, 187 (2012).
64
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continued upon the lot or in the structure so occupied and any such structure may be restored or
repaired in the event of partial destruction thereof.” 69 The statute thus allows shoreline
homeowners to repair storm damages. It also enables these homeowners to come into
conformance with new zoning standards for climate-change mitigation by, for example, raising
their homes to avoid flooding.

B.

A Primer on Eminent Domain
Eminent domain may be useful in mitigating the ecological and economic harms of

climate change because it enables the state to take land that is vulnerable to repetitive flooding.
The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution imposes two
limitations on the state’s power to exercise eminent domain: the government (1) can only take
property for “public use” and (2) must provide “just compensation.” 70 The New Jersey
Constitution likewise provides: “[p]rivate property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation.”71 The New Jersey Supreme Court has held that the protections afforded by the
State’s constitution are “coextensive” with the protections afforded by the United States
Constitution.72
Any use that is dedicated to a public purpose qualifies as a valid public use.73 The public
use doctrine has expanded in recent years, giving legislatures broad latitude in determining what

69

N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55D-68 (West 2020).
U.S. CONST. amend. V; see also N.J. CONST. of 1947, art. IV, § 6, P 3 (“Any agency . . . which may be
empowered to take or otherwise acquire private property for any public [uses] . . . may be authorized by law . . . but
such taking shall be with just compensation.”).
71 N.J. C ONST . art. I, § 20.
72 Mansoldo v. State, 898 A.2d 1018 (N.J. 2006).
73 Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 479, 481 (2005) (“It is within the power of the legislature to
determine that the community should be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as
well as carefully patrolled.” (quoting Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954))).
70
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needs justify the exercise of the takings power.74 Although the government “may not take the
property of A for the sole purpose of transferring it to another private party B,” it “may transfer
property from one private party to another if future use by the public is the purpose of the taking”
or, for example, if the purpose of the taking is economic development. 75
The Constitution’s guarantee of just compensation ensures that the property owner will
be “in the same position monetarily as he would have occupied if his property had not been
taken.”76 Therefore, compensation is just if it is based on the fair market value of the property at
the time of the taking.77
In City of Long Branch v. Liu, beachfront property owners claimed that the state owed
them compensation for the taking of their property for a state-funded beach renourishment
project.78 The City of Long Branch passed an ordinance creating a redevelopment project, which
sought to acquire oceanfront property, including the commercial property owned by the
plaintiffs, the Lius’s.79 Plaintiffs rejected the City’s $900,000 offer and the City initiated a
condemnation action.80 At this time, the property had increased by two acres from the deed
description due to a beach replenishment project undertaken by the Army Corps of Engineers in
the 1990s.81 The Lius family argued that the City’s action should account for the increased
shoreline landmass resulting from the replenishment project and that they should be compensated
for the taking of this newly created land. 82 The New Jersey Supreme Court applied the doctrine

74

Dana Berliner, Public Power, Private Gain: A Five-Year, State-by-State Report Examining the Abuse of Eminent
Domain, I NST. FOR JUST. (April 2003), https://ij.org/report/public-power-private-gain/.
75 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 481.
76 Almota Farmers Elevator & Warehouse Co. v. United States, 409 U.S. 470, 474 (1973) (quoting United States v.
Reynolds, 379 U.S. 14, 16 (1970)).
77 See, e.g., id. at 474.
78 4 A.3d 542, 547 (N.J. 2010).
79 Id. at 546.
80 Id.
81 Id. at 546–47.
82 Id. at 547.
14

of avulsion because the average high water mark remained the boundary line between stateowned and privately-owned property.83 Therefore, the court held that the plaintiffs could not be
recompensed for the taking of property to which they had no right.84

C.

Regulatory Takings
Even when the government does not overtly exercise its eminent domain power and

initiate a condemnation proceeding, a landowner may argue that a land use regulation works, in
effect, as a taking.85 A regulatory taking includes (1) ad hoc balancing takings and (2)
categorical takings that are either (a) physical takings or (b) total takings.86
An ad hoc balancing claim involves government regulations that have unreasonably
“interfered with [the claimant’s] distinct investment-backed expectations.”87 In Penn Central
Transportation Co. v. City of New York, the Supreme Court used an ad hoc balancing test to
determine whether a regulatory taking had occurred.88 Penn Central involved a challenge to
New York City’s historic landmarking law, which precluded the development of air space above
Grand Central Terminal.89 The Supreme Court balanced several factors: the owner’s ability to
continue current use, the mitigating effects of transferable development rights, the reciprocity of
the law’s burdens and benefits, and the distinct investment-backed expectations; ultimately, the
Court upheld the law.90 The Court added that the landowner’s economic interests must be

83

Id. at 555.
City of Long Branch, 4 A.3d at 555.
85 See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
86 See id. at 124–38 (finding that physical takings and state and local regulation may constitute unconstitutional
takings requiring just compensation); Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
87 Penn Cent., 438 U.S.at 124.
88 See generally id. at 104.
89 Id. at 107.
90 Id. at 138.
84
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weighed against the nature of the government action and whether it can be characterized as a
physical invasion or a mere interference for the public good.91
In a physical takings claim, private property owners must allege that the government has
authorized a physical occupation of all or part of their property.92 In Stop the Beach
Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Department of Environmental Protection, the Supreme Court
indicated that the government’s right to renourish and protect the coastline might be superior to
the rights of private landowners.93 The Florida legislature had passed the Beach and Shore
Preservation Act in 1961, creating procedures for beach restoration and renourishment projects
by depositing sand on eroded beaches (restoration) and maintaining the deposited sand
(renourishment).94 Walton County and the city of Destin received permits to restore seven miles
of beach that had been eroded by hurricanes. 95 Members of a nonprofit corporation who owned
beachfront property alleged that the state and local governments’ restoration projects were
unconstitutional takings because it deprived them of their rights to accretion.96 The Supreme
Court held that there was no taking because the restoration and renourishment projects did not
infringe on coastal landowners’ rights.97 The Court deduced two principles from Florida law: (1)
the state, as the owner of submerged land adjacent to beachfront property, has the right to fill that
land, and (2) the avulsion, or exposure of previously submerged land, belongs to the state even if
it interrupts a beachfront property owner’s contact with the water. 98 Because the plaintiffs could

91

Id. at 124.
See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan Catv Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982); Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S.
519, 522 (1992).
93 560 U.S. 702 (2010).
94 Id. at 709.
95 Id. at 711.
96 Id.
97 Id. at 731.
98 Id. at 730.
92
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not show that they had rights to future avulsions or contact with the water that trumped the
state’s right to fill submerged land, there was no taking. 99
In categorical total takings claims, property owners argue that they were required to
“sacrifice all economically beneficial uses in the name of the common good, that is, to leave
[their] property economically idle.”100 Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council demonstrates
when coastal protection may go “too far” as to be considered a taking.101 There, the Court held
that the Beachfront Management Act (BMA) in South Carolina, which barred Lucas from
erecting structures on his beachfront property, totally deprived the property of all beneficial uses
and constituted an economic wipeout.102 The Court concluded that the BMA was a per se
taking.103
The New Jersey Supreme Court in Spiegle v. Beach Haven, however, rejected a
categorical takings claim that a regulation was so onerous as to bar any real beneficial use. 104 In
response to a disastrous storm that hit Long Beach Island, New Jersey, in 1962, Beach Haven
adopted an ordinance preventing construction east of an ocean-side geographic line.105 The
plaintiffs had erected fences extending ocean-ward, in violation of the ordinance, and the
defendant removed the fences.106 Plaintiffs filed suit and sought damages for the demolition of
the fence, arguing that the “ordinance [was] unconstitutional because if the regulations were
enforced against their particularly described land they would be deprived of its use.” 107
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The New Jersey Supreme Court held that the defendants produced unrebutted evidence
“that it would be unsafe to construct houses [ocean-ward] of the building line . . . because of the
possibility that they would be destroyed during a severe storm—a result which occurred during
the storm of March 1962.”108 Further, the court noted, “that such regulation prescribed only such
conduct as good husbandry would dictate that plaintiffs should themselves impose on the use of
their own lands.”109
A New Jersey appellate court reached a similar conclusion based on a due process
argument in McGovern v. Borough of Harvey Cedars:
“[i]n light of the island’s history of devastating storm damage, we cannot say that
an ordinance prohibiting building close to the water’s edge in order to protect the
dunes and to prevent property damage from storms, is irrational, arbitrary or
lacking a real and substantial relationship to the purpose of protecting the public
health, safety and welfare.”110
Spiegle and McGovern indicate New Jersey courts’ willingness to recognize the heightened
public interest at stake when the government regulates for purposes of protecting our coastlines.
They also suggest that these interests may be superior to the property rights of landowners.
In attempting to regulate use of coastal property to mitigate sea level rise, New Jersey is
likely to face more regulatory takings claims. Courts’ approaches to these claims, whether for
categorical or ad hoc balancing takings, should grant wide latitude and flexibility to
municipalities when the zoning ordinance is enacted for purposes of adapting to climate change.
New Jersey’s options—zoning ordinances and the exercise of eminent domain powers—
are inefficient, delayed responses to the threat of global warming. These options may lead to
increased litigation if the state does not provide just compensation or the regulation’s economic
deprivation is so extreme that it affects a taking. Part IV critiques such options and Part V
108
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advocates for an expansive view of nuisance law to prevent development in vulnerable coastal
communities and serve as an affirmative defense to landowners’ takings claims.
IV.

Critique of New Jersey’s Existing Options to Fight Climate Change

In response to the impending threats of climate change and recent superstorms such as
Hurricane Sandy, New Jersey has considered a variety of programs and doctrines as a means of
adapting and mitigating these threats. In 2019, Gov. Phil Murphy signed an executive
order creating the Climate and Flood Resilience Program at the state’s Department of
Environmental Protection.111 The order established an Interagency Council on Climate
Resilience, comprised of sixteen state agencies, to develop short-term and long-term plans.112
Prior to this order, the Sustainable and Resilient Coastal Communities project, funded by the
NJDEP, released a report that outlined strategies municipalities can take to respond to rising seas
levels.113 These include refocusing development and capital investments, enacting more resilient
building standards, and protecting wetlands.114 The report also directed the state to support
communities by adopting uniform projections of sea level rise to determine how projects and
programs receive state funding, creating a coast-wide adaptation plan to serve as a framework,
revising the state’s land use laws to require risk management on the part of localities, and
developing sustainable financing sources to help communities implement adaptation measures.115
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All of these strategies have legal implications for eminent domain jurisprud ence, regulatory
takings jurisprudence, and nuisance doctrine.
This section will analyze and critique the current options implemented by and available
to New Jersey. Part A critiques the use of eminent domain as a means of acquiring easements
for beach restoration projects. Part B discusses the limits of the public trust doctrine since it is
best applied to undeveloped areas and not New Jersey’s highly developed coastline. Finally, Part
C exposes the inherent limitations in the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) and
voluntary buyout programs, which represent ad hoc responses to storm damage and
unsustainable methods of fighting climate change-related property loss.

A.

Eminent Domain’s Limited Use as a Means of Acquiring Easements for Beach
Restoration Projects
One potential solution state and local governments can implement is the use of eminent

domain to condemn at-risk properties.116 Eminent domain, however, is an extreme measure that
is fact-intensive, costly, controversial, and leads to community disruption. 117 This Comment
argues that it should be a last-resort effort to acquire parts of property, specifically, for dune
replenishment projects.118 The methods discussed in this section are only narrowly useful for
combatting the effects of climate change in certain instances but insufficient for protecting New
Jersey coastlines from all the effects of climate change moving forward.
The federal government has presented state and local officials nationwide with a difficult
choice: “[a]gree to use eminent domain to force people out of flood -prone homes, or forfeit a
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shot at federal money they need to combat climate change.” 119 This choice is part of an effort by
the Army Corps of Engineers to protect Americans from flooding and coastal storms. 120 At the
end of 2015, “the Corps said that voluntary programs were ‘not acceptable’ and that all future
buyout programs ‘must include the option to use eminent domain, where warranted.’”121 The
Corps has a formula to decide which homes should be condemned:
It estimates how much damage a house is likely to suffer in the next 50 years,
then compares that to what it would cost to buy and tear down the house, plus
moving expenses for the owner. If the buyout costs less, the homeowner is asked
to sell for the assessed value of the home. That price is not negotiable, and
neither is the offer.122
Although New Jersey has declined to evict residents,123 the Corps is pressing the state to
use eminent domain or face loss of federal funds to fight climate change. 124 Gene Pawlik,
spokesman for NJDEP, said in 2020: “Eminent domain procedures should only be used when
direct purchase negotiations with land owners fail to reach an agreement on price or when land
title matters prevent closing the transaction, and the planned project cannot be completed for the
greater public benefit without acquisition of those properties.” 125
While New Jersey is unlikely to resort to eminent domain as a means of condemning
entire properties, this power remains a viable option for taking easements over beachfront
properties for purposes of beach replenishment programs. An easement is an interest in land in
another’s possession, entitling the easement holder to limited use or enjoyment of that land. 126
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Beach nourishment programs take sand from other sources and place it on an eroded beach to
build up dunes and broaden coastal surfaces. 127 But this often creates a costly cycle of erosion
and replenishment.128
The New Jersey Supreme Court addressed the use of eminent domain to obtain an
easement in Borough of Harvey Cedars v. Karan, a case that arose out of a dune building project
on Long Beach Island (LBI).129 LBI is a densely populated barrier island in Ocean County, and
the island’s tourism-related industries significantly contribute to the county’s $14.2 billion gross
income.130 In recognition of LBI’s massive economic contribution, the federal government and
the island’s municipalities jointly established a storm protection and beach restoration project in
2008.131 This included a dune renourishment plan to enlarge the dunes and protect homes from
flooding during storm surges.132 These dunes were either adjacent to or on private property, and
state and local governments were responsible for acquiring the property. 133 In the borough of
Harvey Cedars, sixty-six property owners gave the municipality permission, leaving sixteen
properties over which the municipality had to exercise eminent domain. 134 One of the properties
belonged to the Karans.135 The borough offered them $300 for the right to build a dune on their
ocean-side property; the Karans refused, arguing that they deserved more compensation because
the dune would diminish their ocean view.136 The municipality initiated the condemnation
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procedure and a commission appointed by the trial court 137 determined that compensation be set
at $700.138 Again, the Karans refused, relying on New Jersey’s condemnation jurisprudence. 139
New Jersey higher courts had instructed lower courts to disregard the public benefits that would
accrue through the condemnation, even if the property at issue would benefit, as well.140 The
trial court judge concluded that the jury should not hear the benefits of the dune project, and the
jury calculated that Harvey Cedars owed the Karans $375,000 in compensation. 141
On appeal, the New Jersey Supreme Court opted to change its approach to partial takings
cases. It determined that when calculating the amount of just compensation owed, it must
consider the public benefit—here, the storm protection provided by the dunes. 142 In cases where
eminent domain is used to take an easement, i.e., partial takings, New Jersey courts did not have
a straightforward method of determining the fair market value of the property for compensation
purposes.143 Eschewing its own precedent, the Court held: “the fair-market considerations that
inform computing just compensation in partial takings cases should be no different than in totaltakings cases. They are the considerations that a willing buyer and a willing seller would weigh
in coming to an agreement on the property’s value at the time of the taking.” 144
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After the state supreme court handed down its decision, the parties settled for $1.145 The
Army Corps constructed a two-story-high dune in 2008.146 It was because of these dunes that the
Karans’ $1.7 million home withstood Hurricane Sandy, which ravaged parts of the coast without
improved barriers.147
It is evident that the use of eminent domain to condemn one’s entire property is
problematic from a mitigation policy point of view because it is fact-intensive, costly, and
controversial. Eminent domain, however, is an effective tool in acquiring easements to build
dunes as part of beach renourishment projects. Dune restoration and beach renourishment are
primary means of protecting the shoreline from rising sea levels.148 As sea levels rise, tidal
marshlands and beaches migrate inland.149 These lands can keep pace with a 0.1 inch per year
rate of sea level rise; New Jersey’s current rate of sea level rise, however, is 0.11 to 0.16 inches
per year, a rate that is expected to increase.150 Despite these threats, “[t]here is currently no
coordinated, interagency effort to identify agreed upon estimates for future sea level rise.”151 In
formulating New Jersey’s broader plan to adapt and mitigate the effects of climate change,
condemnation proceedings should be used to obtain easements where beachfront property
owners are resisting such protective measures. In conjunction with beach replenishment and like
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programs, courts should take an expansive approach to nuisance doctrine, as discussed below in
Part V, to enable the state to accomplish its mitigation strategies. 152

B.

Limits of the Public Trust Doctrine
Another potential legal solution to mitigate the effects of climate change is an extension

of the public trust doctrine.153 This doctrine is based on the premise that certain areas are of such
public importance that they are unsuited for private ownership and better held by the government
in trust for the people.154 In 2019, Governor Murphy enshrined the public trust doctrine into
state law.155 The statute ensures that people’s ownership of coastal shorelines is held in trust by
the state and other public entities, protecting the public’s right to access these public trust
lands.156
The New Jersey Supreme Court expanded this doctrine in Borough of Neptune City v.
Borough of Avon-by-the-Sea, recognizing that the “public’s rights in tidal lands . . . extend [to]
recreational uses, including bathing, swimming, and other shore activities.” 157 The court
emphasized that the “public trust doctrine, like all common law principles, should not be
considered fixed or static, but should be molded and extended to meet changing conditions and
needs of the public it was created to benefit.”158
In Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Association, the state’s highest court further
expanded the doctrine to include the public’s right to access some privately owned beaches under
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certain circumstances.159 While holding that the association’s restriction on beach access to
residents only was contrary to the public’s right to enjoy ocean-related recreation, the Matthews
court also noted the need to accommodate the private property owners’ rights.160 Because much
of New Jersey’s vulnerable coastline is highly developed, 161 however, this doctrine is of limited
applicability to the state’s current situation because it is best applied to undeveloped areas such
as tidal lands.

C.

Problems with the National Flood Insurance Program and Voluntary Buyout Programs
The National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) is a federally-backed flood-insurance

program intended to expand protection for homeowners whose standard homeowners’ insurance
does not cover flood damage.162 Homeowners seeking to file a claim must comply with the
NFIP’s standards.163 Under the NFIP, New Jersey has the third -highest repetitive loss.164 Since
the 1970s, more than 3,300 New Jersey homes and businesses have been repeatedly flooded and
rebuilt.165 Repairs have been covered under the NFIP and have cost about $700 million. 166
Seventy percent of these properties have been repaired at least five times, with a median payment
for each flood of about $25,000.167 Hurricane Sandy resulted in an additional 144,000 claims
and $6.25 billion in debt, “as well as allegations that thousands of homeowners were wrongfully
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denied payouts by companies administering flood insurance on FEMA’s behalf.” 168 What
exacerbates the issue is that there is no limit to the number of claims an individual can make and
the emphasis is on rebuilding, not mitigating.169
Federal guidelines under the NFIP require elevation or demolition if damage is estimated
at fifty percent or more of the home’s value. 170 Beachfront properties, however, are assessed too
low compared to their high property value.171 This is because the NFIP’s building standards are
based on the Flood Insurance Rate Map (FIRM), which does not account for future flooding. 172
Although these standards may be effective today, their future effectiveness will reduce as the
FIRM fails to reflect changing flood conditions. 173
While the NFIP could, in theory, discourage development in areas prone to flooding since
potential buyers would have to consider the cost of insurance when buying a home, 174 the
opposite has occurred. After NFIP’s enactment, development in flood -prone areas increased.175
NFIP premiums are cheap and do not accurately reflect the risk of flooding and, in effect,
subsidize the development of previously undesirable land.176 But, “[m]aking the homeowners
pay rates that reflect their true flood risk could . . . mean sharp premium hikes and a public
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backlash over affordability.”177 Congress must decide whether to raise rates on the one in five
homeowners who pay below-market premiums.178 The NFIP is currently financially insolvent
and relies on bailouts from the federal government.179 As of December 2019, the NFIP is
$20.525 billion in debt.180
The NFIP also provides funding for buyout programs. These programs have their own
inherent limitations due to limited funding, their voluntary nature, and their reactive rather than
proactive responses. Through the Hazard Mitigation Grant Program, “FEMA, the administrative
agency responsible for the NFIP, is allowed to fund up to 75% of the expenses of voluntary
buyouts.”181 These subsidies, however, vary based on the timing of the buyout plan: “the 75%
contribution occurring only after a federally-declared major disaster.”182 The present structure
thus “incentivizes states and localities to voluntarily buy out homeowners and property, but to
wait until after a disaster declaration to do so.”183
NJDEP’s Blue Acres program, implemented after Hurricane Sandy, buys back vulnerable
properties on a voluntary basis.184 Blue Acres relies on a number of eligibility requirements. 185
Criteria include a property’s history of repeated flooding 186 and whether the acquired property is
suitable for recreational activities.187 The program targets clusters of flood damaged homes or
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entire neighborhoods for purchase, offers up to 100% of the pre-storm value of the home, and
seeks to demolish these homes to create conservational areas. 188 As of 2016, the program has
extended 900 offers and has successfully purchased almost 700 homes.189
While the program appears to be successful, there are several criticisms. As a strictly
voluntary program, the cluster approach requires collective participation of willing sellers. 190
This leads to the problem of holdouts, which would require use of eminent domain to initiate a
condemnation proceeding, an option which is undesirable to many. Jeff Tittel, director of the
New Jersey Sierra Club, argues that the Jersey Shore is being excluded from the program. 191
Most of the “program’s $300 million budget has purchased homes in neighborhoods with values
far lower than many Sandy-flooded Shore communities.”192
There has also been political backlash to the Blue Acres Program. Local politicians
claim that this affects municipalities’ tax base.193 Mayor Robert Campbell of Downe Township
stated that his township “stands to lose 6%, or $9 million, in ratables – after having already lost
10% of the ratable base after Sandy.”194 Federal agencies are also putting pressure on
municipalities by making the availability of future assistance contingent on localities’
participation in the buyout.195
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Voluntary buyout programs, and other NFIP-related remedies, represent ad hoc responses
to storm damage. With the impending threats of climate change, however, the state must work to
mitigate property loss, not just respond to it after a disastrous storm hits. The NFIP as it
currently operates is an unsustainable method of fighting property loss due to climate change.
V.

Expanding Nuisance Doctrine

To succeed in holding back the sea, New Jersey must adopt data-driven solutions based
on the theory that repetitive flooding and the destruction of natural resources is per se a nuisance.
Eminent domain, public trust doctrine, the NFIP, and voluntary buyout programs have limited
applicability and are ill-suited to mitigate the effects of global warming. Instead, this Comment
advocates for New Jersey courts to adopt an expansive view of nuisance law to combat further
development in vulnerable coastal communities. Environmental regulations that restrict the
development and destruction of wetlands and other aquatic resources can be construed as laws
preventing harm to the community, thereby serving as government’s defense to landowners’
takings claims.
Some commentators have suggested the use of nuisance law to combat further
development in vulnerable coastal communities. 196 Nuisance law balances private landowners’
property rights against those of the neighboring community.197 This option is premised on the
notion that “the destruction of wetlands or other aquatic resources constitutes a public
nuisance.”198 Many jurisdictions have found that the destruction of these resources is a
“community harm,” and some have gone even further to hold that such nuisances serve as a
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“preclusive defense” to a landowner’s takings claim. 199 Nuisance doctrine can come into play
when weighing the burdens against the benefits of an alleged government taking. One could
argue that land use inconsistent with environmental conservation measures is not part of a
landowner’s bundle of property rights.200 Not all courts, however, are willing to adopt such a
premise.201
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council provides that nuisance doctrine may function as
an affirmative defense in cases where government regulation deprives property of all
economically beneficial use.202 Petitioner Lucas had purchased two residential lots in Charleston
County, South Carolina, that he intended to build homes on.203 The Beachfront Management Act
(BMA), however, had the effect of barring Lucas from erecting any habitable structures on these
two parcels.204 Lucas argued that the BMA extinguished his property’s value and amounted to a
taking.205 Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, agreed. The Court held that when a state enacts
a regulation depriving the landowner of all economically beneficial use, the state may avoid
paying compensation only if the landowner’s use was not part of the landowner’s original title,
but rather inherited through preexisting restrictions imposed by state property law and nuisance
law on land ownership.206 The Court reasoned that nuisance doctrine, as an affirmative defense,
should be considered in an “antecedent inquiry into the nature of the owner’s estate.”207 At this
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stage, the government bears the burden of proving that “the proscribed use interests were not part
of [the landowner’s] title to begin with.”208
The Court remanded the case to determine whether state common law would have
prevented Lucas from erecting a habitable structure on his land. 209 On remand, the South
Carolina Supreme Court found that state common law principles did not prevent a nuisance;
therefore, a taking had occurred.210
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence stressed the importance of a broad construction of the
defense, asserting that “the common law of nuisance is too narrow a confine for the exercise of
regulatory power in a complex and interdependent society.”211 This “antecedent inquiry” has
suspended “the principle question in a traditional takings analysis—did the government go too
far?” until the court considers the question, “did the landowner go too far?”212 Recognition of
nuisance doctrine as a defense to takings claims enables the government when regulating for
purposes of mitigating the effects of global warming, to prevail in the early stages of litigation.
The New Jersey Supreme Court might favor Justice Kennedy’s theory of nuisance
doctrine as evidenced from its decision in Karan.213 Holding that it was an error to not instruct
the jury on the benefits of a protective sand dune, the Karan court reasoned that the burden to the
individual property owner “may be infinitesimal compared to the value added to their home by
the dune protection.”214 Likewise, in Chirichello v. Zoning Board of Adjustment, the New Jersey
Supreme Court observed that environmental regulations restricting private land use “may have a
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greater claim to public interest than traditional zoning.” 215 As the McGovern court noted: “we
cannot say that an ordinance prohibiting building close to the water’s edge in order to protect the
dunes and to prevent property damage from storms, is irrational, arbitrary or lacking a real and
substantial relationship to the purpose of protecting the public health, safety and welfare.” 216
This suggests that New Jersey courts may have a proclivity towards “liberalizing legal theories
based on nuisance or public trust doctrine.”217 By granting claims of environmental protection
greater weight in the regulatory takings analysis, New Jersey courts would support legislative
efforts of climate change mitigation.
VI.

A Proposal for New Jersey

Although New Jersey has attempted to use several of the previously discussed methods to
mitigate the effects of climate change, these methods are inadequate for fully protecting our
coastlines from imminent environmental and economic damage. This Comment urges New
Jersey courts and legislature to overtly recognize nuisance prevention as a legitimate land use
control and defense to regulatory taking claims.
Lawmakers faced with the threat of climate change must adopt holistic, data-driven
solutions to adapt to the new reality of a warming Earth, protect properties from flooding and
storm surges, and defend our unique coastal environment. First and foremost, New Jersey must
require the Climate and Flood Resilience Program, established by Governor Murphy, to
collaborate with state agencies to develop short-term and long-term plans that not only mitigate
the effects of climate change but also adapt to this new reality. Both state and local governments
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must implement the programs’ recommendations into statutory zoning schemes and voluntary
buyout programs.
Part A of this section will advocate for an expansion of preexisting statutory protections
to barrier islands and other coastal areas. Part B recommends that zoning ordinances be
improved to discourage development in vulnerable coastal areas, include stricter non-conforming
use guidelines, and overtly recognize nuisance law as a legitimate land use control and defense to
regulatory takings claims. Finally, Part C suggests the use of voluntary buyout programs as a
last resort when the same effect cannot be achieved through zoning.

A.

Extension of Existing Wetland Protections to Barrier Islands and Coastal Areas
New Jersey has a body of law dealing with environmental protection aimed at conserving

ecological areas such as coastal and freshwater wetlands.218 The regulations establish specific
factors to consider when determining whether a proposed activity in such areas is in the public
interest.219 These factors include the public’s interest in preserving natural resources and the
ecological value of the wetlands, interest of private landowners in economic development, extent
of public and private need for the proposed activity, practicability of alternative sites, permanent
beneficial or detrimental effects of the proposed activity, and quantity of wetlands that will be
disturbed.220 These environmental laws constitute exceptional protection of wetlands. The
environments affected by climate change, however, are not limited to wetlands. This Comment
calls on New Jersey to extend such protections to coastal areas and barrier islands—regions that
are equally valuable from an ecological perspective since they often protect wetlands. 221
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B.

Updated Zoning Ordinances, Recognition of Nuisance Doctrine, and Limits of Eminent
Domain
This comment argues that zoning ordinances be used to discourage development in flood -

prone areas. Local planners must use up-to-date flood mapping and climate change projections
to determine which coastal areas are most at risk from rising sea level. Based on predictions of
who is most at-risk, planners should impose stricter guidelines for new development in these
areas. Such regulations would expand upon that which is already authorized by the MLUL. 222
Currently, the MLUL authorizes regulations that include zoning for low-density uses,
establishing minimum requirements for construction, and requiring setbacks from shorelines.223
Municipalities should take such regulations one step further and limit property owners’ ability to
rebuild structures subject to repetitive flood losses.
This may present a problem of the nonconforming use—when ownership and use of a
property predates a zoning ordinance prohibiting such use.224 In the interest of eliminating such
uses and achieving uniformity within a zoning area, the state may impose restrictions on
nonconforming landowners by limiting expansion or reconstruction of the property.225
In New Jersey, “[a]ny nonconforming use or structure existing at the time of the passage
of an ordinance may be continued upon the lot or in the structure so occupied and any such
structure may be restored or repaired in the event of partial destruction thereof.”226 The statute
thus allows shoreline homeowners to repair storm damages. It also enables these homeowners to
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come into conformance with new zoning standards for climate-change mitigation by, for
example, raising their homes to avoid flooding.
The MLUL does not define what constitutes partial destruction.227 In Motley v. Borough
of Seaside Park Zoning Board of Adjustment, however, the New Jersey Appellate Division held
that a landowner’s demolition of his nonconforming property did not qualify as a partial
destruction, but rather, a total destruction.228 In Motley, the plaintiff owned a property in Seaside
Park Borough that was restricted to single-family use.229 The property was a nonconforming,
preexisting use because the two structures built before the enactment of the zoning ordinance did
not conform to the ordinance’s lot and setback requirements.230 After suffering water damage
from water pipes that had burst, the entire structure had to be removed. 231 The plaintiff tore
down the structure to its foundation for reconstruction, and the Zoning Board issued a stop work
order, concluding that the reconstruction exceeded the plaintiff’s zoning permit.232 The Motley
court noted that there is a policy of closely restricting nonconforming uses and stated the
applicable inquiry: “the test of whether a nonconforming use or structure may be restored or
repaired is whether there has been some quantity of destruction that surpasses mere partial
destruction.”233 The property was then severely damaged in Superstorm Sandy.234
In coastal areas prone to flooding and erosion, preexisting uses must be phased out by
gradually reducing development and discouraging new growth. While localities are not allowed
to take active steps to eliminate nonconforming uses, they may impose restrictions on them and
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prohibit their expansion.235 By making a strict distinction between partial and total destruction,
municipalities and courts can impose more stringent restrictions in coastal areas already ravaged
by storm surges and flooding. Phasing out such uses will also minimize the damage sustained
during coastal storms and rising sea levels, thereby reducing the cost of such damage.
New Jersey should enact new statutes recognizing that development in areas already
vulnerable to repeated flooding is a nuisance that the government can regulate to minimize and
mitigate. These statutes should declare that regulation for the purposes of environmental
protection is a public purpose; thereby, they would overtly recognize nuisance prevention as a
legitimate land use control and defense to regulatory taking claims. Under Lucas, the
legislature’s findings must be based on common law principles. 236 Since this Comment argues
that New Jersey Courts are open to the notion that the common law of nuisance is robust enough
to protect oceanfront communities, the legislature would echo and reinforce the common law.
Therefore, the statutes would codify the common law principles of nuisance. New Jersey laws
should declare that if an area is so vulnerable to the effects of climate change—flooding, storm
surges, erosion, etc.—then it is per se a nuisance to continue using that land. This would save
the state the expenses associated with defending a condemnation proceeding and further
conservationist interests.
The New Jersey Supreme Court’s holding in Mansoldo v. State suggests this sort of
expansive view of nuisance law.237 In that case, the NJDEP had restricted construction on
Mansoldo’s vacant property which was in a floodway to limit flood damage. 238 Mansoldo was
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thus prevented from constructing two residential buildings that were otherwise permitted .239 The
Mansoldo court reversed the lower court decisions and established the proper inquiry: whether
the regulation denied the landowner all economically beneficial use of the property and, if so,
whether the state was required to pay just compensation unless property and nuisance law
principles precluded the intended use.240
Similarly, in Seven Mile Island, L.L.C. v. Planning Bd. of Avalon, the New Jersey
Appellate Division announced a deferential approach to municipalities’ broad police powers.241
At issue in Seven Mile Island was the Borough of Avalon’s enactment of beach protection
ordinances, which prohibited the construction of pools in dune areas and whether these
ordinances were preempted by CAFRA or the MLUL.242 The court held that municipalities on
barrier islands vulnerable to storm damage might “adopt ordinances consistent with and similar
to, but more stringent than, CAFRA’s requirements in order to address its local concerns.”243
Further, it concluded that a prohibition “on construction of swimming pools in dunes, an
environmentally sensitive area, is rationally related to an important public purpose.”244
Mansoldo and Seven Mile Island evince New Jersey state courts’ willingness to defer to
localities initiatives to protect its vulnerable areas. Municipalities should enact ordinances that
declare that once a building in a coastal area has suffered storm damage, the landowner cannot
rebuild. To limit such damage in coastal areas, municipalities must restrict what construction is
allowed through ordinances such as those at issue in Mansoldo and Seven Mile Island. State
courts, to ensure the effectiveness of local climate change mitigation efforts, should conclude
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that such restrictions do not constitute a regulatory taking because of the nuisance exception
announced in Lucas.245 Recognition that the cycle of rebuilding structures and consequent
destruction of coastal resources is a public nuisance would serve as a preclusive defense to
landowners’ regulatory takings claims.
If the same result could not be achieved through zoning regulations, local governments
may resort to the use of eminent domain. This Comment urges that use of eminent domain be
limited to obtaining easements across a property. Climate change mitigation strategies, such as
beach renourishment projects, pose minimal burdens on the individual property owner while
adding invaluable protection from storm surges and flooding. New Jersey courts have already
demonstrated a proclivity towards this liberal theory of nuisance doctrine and should overtly
incorporate this into takings jurisprudence to prevent unnecessary litigation.

C.

Voluntary Buyout Programs as a Last Resort
New Jersey should only resort to voluntary buyout programs in those cases where the

same effect could not be achieved through zoning. Voluntary buyout programs are limited in
application because they are not feasible on a large-scale level, because of their voluntary nature,
and because they are often used ad hoc—available to homeowners only after their homes have
been destroyed by flooding.246 Such programs, however, can be revised by statute to serve as a
more proactive climate adaptation strategy that integrates scientific data on an areas’
susceptibility to flooding. By focusing on small communities of property owners, buyout
programs can avoid resistance that comes along with taking away a municipality’s tax base.247
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These programs must also ensure that buyout prices adequately re-capture homeowners’ value of
their property and social capital while assisting homeowners in relocating.248
All these remedies require community engagement. State and local actors must ensure
that climate change mitigation is an interactive process with opportunities for public input.
Zoning regulations, dune replenishment projects, and voluntary buyout programs all have
potential to disrupt communities. Engaging locals in the conversation around climate change and
coastal protection is crucial to ensuring the success of these measures and reducing the potential
for litigation.
VII.

Conclusion

To succeed in holding back the sea, New Jersey must adopt data-driven solutions based
on the theory that repetitive flooding and the destruction of natural resources is per se a nuisance.
Rising sea levels threaten private and public interests alike and therefore require a collective
solution. All the tools necessary to adapt to rising sea levels are in place—the scientific models
predicting sea level rise, zoning and takings powers, and jurisprudence that can insulate localities
from takings claims based on nuisance doctrine. These tools now must be put to use. New
Jersey must shift its focus from recovery to mitigation and adaptation, from reactive measures to
proactive measures. Nuisance doctrine is an evolving solution to the evolving problem of global
warming.
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